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INTRODUCTION 
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Marine 
Bank v. Weaver, “Congress, in enacting the securities laws, 
did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all 
fraud.”1  Accordingly, when it drafted section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19342
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law.  This Article 
was presented as part of a New Scholars Panel at the Southeastern Association 
of Law Schools 2012 Annual Conference.  I offer my thanks to Leslie Cooney, 
who served as my mentor for the presentation, and to the participants at the 
conference for their helpful comments.  I also wish to thank Ryan Morrison for 
his research assistance.  All errors and omissions, of course, are my own. 
 (Exchange Act), a broad, 
 1. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006). 
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“catch-all” antifraud provision,3 Congress provided that the 
statute applies only to a fraud that is “in connection with” a 
securities transaction.4  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) appropriately imposed the same limitation 
in Rule 10b-5,5 the SEC’s “powerful antifraud weapon”6
The “in connection with” requirement—sometimes 
referred to as the “transactional nexus” requirement
 under 
section 10(b). 
7—is 
simple in concept, but difficult in application.  Courts long 
have struggled to interpret its breadth.  The Supreme Court 
has considered the issue in only three cases, all three of which 
dealt with the same type of fraud—that involving the 
misappropriation of assets.8  In those cases, the Court 
employed a test that, according to Justice Thomas, reflects 
“an inconsistent and incoherent interpretation of the relevant 
statutory language and . . . does not provide any predictable 
guidance as to what behavior contravenes the statute.”9
The Supreme Court in its few “in connection with” cases 
has stated that, to meet the requirement, a fraud must 
“touch” or “coincide” with a securities transaction.
  
Indeed, the Court’s test is hard to apply even to 
misappropriation cases, and it is difficult to distill from it a 
fundamental principle appropriate to analyze the “in 
connection with” requirement more generally. 
10
 
 3. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). 
  These 
words, unfortunately, do little more than restate the 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added). 
 5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 6. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[2], at 
442 (6th ed. 2009). 
 7. See, e.g., Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund v. Millard, No. 07 Civ. 
172 (JGK), 2007 WL 2141697, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (“[F]raud is ‘in 
connection with’ a purchase or sale when there is a ‘transactional nexus’ 
between the fraud and the transaction.”). 
 8. See generally S.E.C. v. Zandford 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (addressing a 
misappropriation of cash); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) 
(considering the “misappropriation theory” of insider trading); Superintendent 
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 8 (1971) (addressing a 
misappropriation of cash). 
 9. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 692 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 10. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822 (“It is enough that the scheme to defraud 
and the sale of securities coincide.”); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The securities 
transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.”); Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 
12–13 (“The crux of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a 
result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor.”). 
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requirement under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that a fraud 
be “in connection with” a securities transaction.11  They say 
nothing of the degree of connection that is required.12  The 
Court’s emphasis that section 10(b) should be interpreted 
“flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes” only adds to the 
uncertainty.13
Attempting to provide some structure to the 
transactional nexus requirement under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in 2009 devised a multifactor test that draws on cases 
from the Supreme Court and the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits.
 
14
(1) whether a securities sale was necessary to the 
completion of the fraudulent scheme; 
  In SEC v. Pirate 
Investor LLC, the Fourth Circuit identified four relevant 
factors to be considered: 
(2) whether the parties’ relationship was such that it 
would necessarily involve trading in securities; 
(3) whether the defendant intended to induce a securities 
transaction; and 
(4) whether material misrepresentations were 
disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a 
reasonable investor would rely.15
The court indicated that the factors “exist merely to guide the 
inquiry,” and stressed that they “are not mandatory 
 
 
 11. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, The “In Connection With” Requirement of 
Rule 10b-5, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 913, 962 (1989) (emphasizing that the concept of 
“touching” was a product of Justice’s Douglas’s literary style and that he merely 
was stating in a different way that the fraud must be “in connection with” a 
securities transaction); see also S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o say that fraud is ‘in connection with’ a securities 
transaction whenever it ‘coincides’ with that transaction hardly clarifies the 
matter.”); Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir. 
1984) (“We are inclined to agree . . . that ‘there is no reason to believe that 
[Justice Douglas’s] use of ‘touching’ [in Bankers Life] was anything more than 
his variation of ‘in connection with’ as a matter of literary style.’ ”). 
 12. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 962 (noting that “there is nothing in the 
notion of ‘touching’ that implies necessarily either a loose or a tight nexus 
requirement.”). 
 13. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)); see Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 (“Section 
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”). 
 14. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244. 
 15. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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requirements” and are not necessarily the only relevant 
factors.16  Yet, the court provided no general principle for 
determining when a particular factor should apply, how to 
weigh the factors, or how to know when to consider other 
factors.  Consequently, the test runs the risk of being—to 
quote Judge Posner—“like many other multi-factor tests, 
‘redundant, incomplete, and unclear.’ ”17
This Article proposes to save Pirate Investor’s multifactor 
test from redundancy, incompleteness, and lack of clarity by 
introducing a general principle for the “in connection with” 
requirement and suggesting modifications to the Fourth 
Circuit’s factors so that they inform application of the general 
principle.  Part I provides an overview of Rule 10b-5 and the 
elements for civil enforcement actions, criminal prosecutions, 
and private causes of action under the Rule.  Part II analyzes 
the Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to the “in 
connection with” requirement and suggests that those 
decisions, together with Rule 10b-5’s text, support an intent-
based interpretation of the “in connection with” requirement.  
Part II also articulates a reasonable intent-based principle for 
the requirement.  Part III explores Pirate Investor and the 
Third and Tenth Circuit cases on which Pirate Investor bases 
three of the four factors in its multifactor test.  Part III 
asserts that the Supreme Court’s misappropriation test—
which is the first factor in the Fourth Circuit’s test—should 
be limited to misappropriation cases and that the Fourth 
Circuit’s factors should be modified in a manner consistent 
with the general principle described in Part II.  Finally, the 
Article concludes that a fraud should be considered to be “in 
connection with” a securities transaction only when the 
perpetrator of the fraud intends to influence, or knows or is 
reckless in not knowing that his or her actions could 
influence, an investment decision.  It also concludes that 
Pirate Investor’s multifactor test, when guided by and 
modified to serve this principle, provides a workable 
framework for determining when a fraud is “in connection 
 
 
 16. Id. (“[W]e do not presume to exclude other factors that could help 
distinguish between fraud in the securities industry and common law fraud that 
happens to involve securities.”). 
 17. Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 196 F.3d 833, 834 
(7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 
1986)). 
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with” the purchase or sale of a security for purposes of Rule 
10b-5. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RULE 10B-5 
The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942 pursuant to its 
authority under Exchange Act section 10(b).18
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
  The Rule 
provides: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.19
Rule 10b-5 proscribes three different categories of 
fraud
 
20: (i) misstatements,21 (ii) misleading statements,22 and 
(iii) pure omissions (i.e., silence) when there is a duty to 
disclose.23
 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 729 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d 
Cir. 1952). 
  The Rule applies, however, only when a false or 
misleading statement or omission is material—that is, when 
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 20. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND ANALYSIS 281 (3d ed. 2011) (identifying “omissions in breach of 
fiduciary duty,” “half-truths,” and “affirmative misstatements” as three 
categories of Rule 10b-5 fraud). 
 21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o 
make any untrue statement of a material fact.”). 
 22. See id. (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”) 
 23. See id. § 240.10b-5(a), (c); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 
(1980) (indicating that liability for a failure to disclose material information 
only arises if there is a duty to disclose); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53  (1972) (noting that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition 
against fraud by omission when there is a duty to disclose is found in the first 
and third subparagraphs of the Rule). 
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there is a “substantial likelihood that the [statement or 
omission] . . . would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information available.”24  Moreover, a Rule 10b-5 action is 
viable only if the defendant acted with scienter, which the 
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder defined as “a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud”25 and which lower courts have expanded to include 
reckless behavior.26
The SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and private 
plaintiffs have recourse under Rule 10b-5.
 
27  Although the 
text of the Rule does not specify a private cause of action, 
courts have found that one is implied.28
 
 24. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
  Standing for a 
private cause of action, however, is limited to purchasers and 
sellers of securities and does not extend to those who fail to 
purchase or sell securities because of fraudulent 
 25. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).  The Court 
stated expressly that it was not ruling on whether recklessness may constitute 
scienter.  See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (1976) (“We need not address 
here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is 
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).  In Aaron v. SEC, the 
Supreme Court determined that scienter also is required for SEC enforcement 
actions.  Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980);  See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 
12.8[1], at 457 (“The Supreme Court . . . held in Aaron v. SEC that the scienter 
standard applies under Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether the action is one for 
damages or an enforcement action brought by the Commission.”). 
 26. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Reckless 
conduct may also constitute scienter.”); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs 
Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[L]iability requires proof of the 
defendant’s ‘scienter,’ which is to say proof that he either knew the statement 
was false or was reckless in disregarding the substantial risk that it was 
false.”); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 n.3 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“In a Rule 10b-5 action, scienter requires a showing of ‘intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud,’ or reckless conduct.”) (citations omitted); Robert N. 
Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]e have ‘long premised liability on at least reckless behavior.’ ”); Hollinger v. 
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Our circuit, . . . along 
with ten other circuits, has held that recklessness may satisfy the element of 
scienter in a civil action for damages under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
 27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006) (authorizing SEC actions to enforce rules 
under the Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (providing for fines and 
imprisonment). 
 28. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975); 
see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 
(1971) (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 
10(b).”). 
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misstatements or omissions.29
To be successful in a civil enforcement action, a criminal 
prosecution, or a private cause of action, the SEC, the 
Department of Justice, or the private plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant made a material misstatement or 
omission, that the defendant acted with scienter, and that the 
misstatement or omission was made “in connection with” a 
securities transaction.
 
30  A private plaintiff must go further 
and prove that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the 
misstatement or omission and that the misstatement or 
omission caused the plaintiff’s loss.31
Although reliance—or “transaction causation,” as it is 
sometimes called
 
32—is an element of a private cause of action 
under Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court in two respects has 
significantly curtailed the burden on plaintiffs to prove 
reliance.  First, a plaintiff need not show reliance at all if the 
fraud is by means of a pure omission.  In such a case, 
according to the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, “[a]ll that is necessary is that the facts 
withheld be material.”33
 
 29. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730–31 (noting that, in Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined 
that plaintiffs in a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 were “limited to 
actual purchasers and sellers of securities” and holding that Birnbaum was 
decided correctly). 
  Second, for securities traded in an 
efficient market, a plaintiff may qualify for a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance.  In Basic v. Levinson, the Court 
validated a presumption of reliance employed by the Sixth 
 30. See S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(listing the elements of a civil enforcement action); Semerenko v. Cendant 
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (listing the elements of a private cause of 
action); United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 
1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 31. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 174 (listing the elements of a private cause 
of action); Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1220 (same); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (listing the elements of a 
private cause of action); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) 
(“A private plaintiff who claims securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s 
fraud caused an economic loss.”). 
 32. Dura Pharm. Inc., 544 U.S. at 341; see HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.11, at 
479–80 (“The concept of transaction causation has been properly characterized 
as nothing more than ‘but for’ causation, and more questionably as merely 
another way of describing reliance.  Although reliance and causation constitute 
distinct elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, transaction causation may be 
established by facts that establish reliance.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 33. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). 
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Circuit when a plaintiff proves: 
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) 
that the misrepresentations were material; (3) that the 
shares were traded on an efficient market; (4) that the 
misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying 
investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that 
the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the 
misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was 
revealed.34
The Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention to 
the elements for a Rule 10b-5 action, particularly those 
necessary for a private cause of action.  Its consideration of 
the “in connection with” requirement, however, has been 
meager at best.  Yet, as the Third Circuit observed in 
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., “the ‘in connection with’ phrase 
is not the least difficult aspect of the 10b-5 complex to tie 
down.”
 
35
II. THE “IN CONNECTION WITH” REQUIREMENT 
 
A. Bankers Life, O’Hagan, and Zandford 
The Supreme Court first addressed Rule 10b-5’s “in 
connection with” requirement in Superintendent of Ins. v. 
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., a case that involved a complex 
scheme under which the purchaser of a corporation’s stock 
misappropriated corporate assets to pay the purchase price of 
the stock.36  Bankers Life & Casualty Company owned all of 
the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co., a casualty insurance 
company, and had agreed to sell the stock to James Begole.37  
Among Manhattan’s assets were U.S. Treasury bonds valued 
at approximately five million dollars, the purchase price 
under the agreement.38
 
 34. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988). 
  To complete the purchase of the 
Manhattan stock, Begole and others working with him 
orchestrated a series of transactions in which they caused 
Manhattan to sell the Treasury bonds for their full market 
value and misappropriated the proceeds to repay a short-term 
 35. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 174. 
 36. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971). 
 37. Id. at 7; see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 
F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 38. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 8. 
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loan taken out to pay the purchase price for the Manhattan 
shares.39  Meanwhile, they made it appear as if Manhattan 
had used the proceeds to purchase a certificate of deposit.40
The transactions rendered Manhattan insolvent, and the 
New York Department of Insurance eventually instituted 
liquidation proceedings.
 
41  In the course of liquidation, the 
Superintendent of Insurance, representing the interests of 
Manhattan, filed a lawsuit seeking damages under Rule 10b-
5 with respect to the sale of Manhattan’s Treasury bonds.42  
Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Manhattan was 
defrauded when members of Manhattan’s board of directors 
authorized the sale of the Treasury bonds based on false 
representations that the proceeds were to be used to purchase 
a certificate of deposit.43
The Supreme Court determined that Begole’s scheme 
represented a fraud on Manhattan “in connection with” the 
sale of the Treasury bonds and, accordingly, that the 
plaintiff’s claims met Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” 
requirement.
 
44  The Court reached this conclusion because 
Manhattan—the seller of the securities—was harmed by 
being deprived of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds 
through “deceptive practices touching its sale of securities.”45
When a person who is dealing with a corporation in a 
securities transaction denies the corporation’s directors 
access to material information known to him, the 
corporation is disabled from availing itself of an informed 
judgment on the part of its board regarding the merits of 
the transaction.  In this situation the private right of 
action recognized under Rule 10b-5
  
Quoting Shell v. Hensley, the Court observed: 
 is available as a 
remedy for the corporate disability.46
 
 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 8–9. 
 41. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 
1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Bankers Life, 430 F.2d at 358. 
 42. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 7. 
 43. Bankers Life, 430 F.2d at 360. 
 44. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9.  Although the complaint alleged fraud in 
connection with the sale of the Manhattan stock, the Court’s opinion only 
addressed whether the fraud was “in connection with” the sale of the Treasury 
bonds.  Id. at 13 n.10. 
 45. Id. at 10, 12–13 (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. at 13 (quoting Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
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Sadly, the Court in Bankers Life did not offer a concrete test 
to apply broadly to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” 
requirement. 
The Supreme Court waited more than twenty-five years 
after Bankers Life before considering Rule 10b-5’s 
transactional nexus requirement again.  In United States v. 
O’Hagan, the Court considered whether trading in securities 
of a company based on information misappropriated from 
someone other than the company represents fraud “in 
connection with” a securities transaction in violation of the 
restrictions against insider trading under Rule 10b-5.47  
Dorsey & Whitney, a Minnesota law firm, represented Grand 
Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) with respect to a possible 
tender offer for Pillsbury Company.48  Before the tender offer 
became public, James O’Hagan, a partner of the firm who was 
not working on the transaction, purchased Pillsbury common 
stock and options.49  When the tender offer was announced, 
the price of Pillsbury’s stock rose considerably and O’Hagan 
sold his stock and options for a $4.3 million profit.50
Whether O’Hagan violated Rule 10b-5 depended on 
whether O’Hagan’s trading on the basis of his information 
about the tender offer was fraud and, if so, whether the fraud 
was “in connection with” his securities transactions.  The 
Court easily found that O’Hagan had engaged in a fraud.
 
51  
Noting that it had previously determined that “[t]he 
undisclosed misappropriation of . . . information, in violation 
of a fiduciary duty, . . . constitutes fraud,”52 the Court 
concluded that O’Hagan committed a fraud on both his law 
firm and Grant Met because, as a partner of the firm, he owed 
a duty to them with respect to the information about the 
tender offer and violated that duty by taking the information 
and using the information for his own benefit.53
The “in connection with” requirement posed a more 
difficult question for the Court.  The law firm and Grand Met 
were not parties to O’Hagan’s securities transactions, and 
 
 
 47. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 48. Id. at 647. 
 49. Id. at 647–48. 
 50. Id. at 648. 
 51. Id. at 653. 
 52. Id. at 654. 
 53. See id. at 653 (noting that O’Hagan’s indictment charged him with 
breaching a duty of trust due his firm and its client). 
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O’Hagan did not deceive the other parties to the transactions 
because he did not owe them any duty to disclose the 
information he had.54  Nevertheless, the Court found that 
O’Hagan’s fraud was “in connection with” his purchase of the 
Pillsbury stock and options, reasoning that O’Hagan’s 
misappropriation of the information about the Pillsbury 
tender offer “coincided” with his trading in the Pillsbury 
securities.55  In adopting this “misappropriation theory” of 
insider trading, the Court observed that the “in connection 
with” requirement “is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud 
is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the 
confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his 
principle, he uses the information to purchase or sell 
securities.”56
The Court asserted that its adoption of the 
“misappropriation theory” was consistent with the purposes 
of the Exchange Act because the theory was necessary to 
protect the integrity of the securities markets.
 
57
The theory is . . . well tuned to an animating purpose of 
the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and 
thereby promote investor confidence. . . . Although 
informational disparity is inevitable in securities markets, 
investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a 
market where trading based on misappropriated 
nonpublic information is unchecked by law.
  According to 
the Court, 
58
The Court warned, however, that its misappropriation 
theory has limits and not all misappropriations that involve 
securities are subject to Rule 10b-5.
 
59
 
 54. Id. at 653 n.5.  The Court observed that, under the classical theory of 
insider trading, the insider’s deception is perpetrated on the other party to the 
transaction.  Id. at 653.  The insider owes a duty of trust and confidence to the 
shareholders of his or her corporation, and when the insider trades in securities 
of the corporation based on material, nonpublic information without disclosing 
the information to the other party to the transaction, the insider breaches a 
duty to the other party to the transaction because the other party either is an 
existing shareholder (in the case of a purchase) or a future shareholder (in the 
case of a sale).  See id. at 652 (noting that insiders owe a duty to the 
shareholders of the corporation and that trading without disclosing material, 
nonpublic information violates the duty and constitutes a deception). 
  For example, according 
 55. Id. at 656. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 653. 
 58. Id. at 658. 
 59. See id. at 656. 
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to the Court, Rule 10b-5 would not apply when a person 
obtains money by fraud and then uses that money to 
purchase securities.60  In such a case, the fraud is not 
sufficiently connected to the securities transaction because 
the money fraudulently obtained can be used for any number 
of purposes.61  The Court noted that, in contrast, use of 
information of the type that O’Hagan obtained is more limited 
and typically is valuable only to the extent that it can be used 
to secure an advantage in a securities transaction.62
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan once again failed to 
express a general principle for Rule 10b-5’s transactional 
nexus requirement.  The Court did, however, provide a test 
for the requirement in the context of fraud accomplished 
through misappropriation.  In a misappropriation case, the 
requirement is met—i.e., a fraud “coincides” with a securities 
transaction—when the securities transaction is necessary to 
complete the fraud.
 
63  This is so even if the person on the 
other side of the transaction is not the one defrauded.64
The Supreme Court returned to Rule 10b-5’s 
transactional nexus requirement most recently in SEC v. 
Zandford, a case involving a broker’s theft of proceeds of sales 
of his clients’ securities.
 
65  Charles Zandford managed a 
discretionary securities account for William Wood and his 
daughter.66  According to the SEC, without the Woods’ 
authorization or disclosure to them, Zandford had written 
checks to himself that, for payment, required liquidation of 
securities in the Woods’ account.67  Consequently, the SEC 
asserted, Zandford had committed fraud “in connection with” 
a securities transaction in violation of Rule 10b-5.68
Taking the allegations in the SEC’s complaint as true, 
the Court determined that the SEC had alleged conduct that 
 
 
 60. Id. at 656. 
 61. Id. at 656–57. 
 62. See id. at 657 (noting that information of the type at issue in the case 
“ordinarily” is valuable because it can be used in trading securities). 
 63. See id. at 656 (“This element is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is 
consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but 
when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase 
or sell securities.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 815. 
 67. Id. at 821. 
 68. Id. at 816. 
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met the “in connection with” requirement.69  According to the 
Court, Zandford’s alleged fraud consisted not of a 
misrepresentation to the Woods, but of Zandford’s failure to 
disclose to them his intention to execute sales of their 
securities and misappropriate the proceeds.70
[t]he securities sales and [Zandford’s] fraudulent practices 
were not independent events.  This is not a case in which, 
after a lawful transaction had been consummated, a 
broker decided to steal the proceeds and did so.  Nor is it a 
case in which a thief simply invested the proceeds of a 
routine conversion in the stock market.  Rather, 
[Zandford’s] fraud coincided with the sales themselves.
  This fraud, the 
Court concluded, “coincided” with the securities transactions 
because 
71
The Court determined that, as a result, the SEC had met the 
pleading requirement for the “in connection with” 
requirement.
 
72
The Supreme Court looked to Bankers Life to support its 
conclusions.  It noted that, “[l]ike the company directors in 
Bankers Life, the Woods were injured as investors through 
[Zandford’s] deceptions, which deprived them of any 
compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.”
 
73  The 
Court drew on Bankers Life further, observing that a fraud 
need not affect the value of the securities involved or the 
“integrity of the securities markets” to meet the “in 
connection with” requirement.74  Moreover, according to the 
Court, the fraud in Zandford posed a greater danger to the 
market than the one in Bankers Trust because a fraud of the 
type in Zandford “[n]ot only . . . prevent[s] investors from 
trusting that their brokers are executing transactions for 
their benefit, but [also] undermines the value of a 
discretionary account.”75
Without any analysis, the Court in Zandford refused to 
read O’Hagan to require, in the case of fraud through 
misappropriation, that the misappropriated assets “not have 
 
 
 69. Id. at 825. 
 70. Id. at 820–21. 
 71. Id. at 820. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 822. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 822–23. 
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independent value to the client outside the securities 
market.”76  It observed, however, that even if O’Hagan 
imposed such a requirement, the fraud at issue in Zandford 
met the requirement.  According to the Court, “the Woods’ 
securities did not have value for [Zandford] apart from their 
use in a securities transaction and [therefore] the fraud was 
not complete before the sale of securities occurred.”77
The “touch” test under Bankers Life and the requirement 
under O’Hagan and Zandford that a fraud “coincide” with a 
securities transaction are so vague that they cannot serve as 
a meaningful general principle for applying Rule 10b-5’s “in 
connection with” requirement.  The cases nevertheless are 
useful because they set out some of the boundaries for the 
transactional nexus requirement and establish a test for 
courts to apply in cases involving fraud accomplished through 
misappropriation. 
 
Bankers Life, O’Hagan, and Zandford describe several 
parameters for Rule 10b-5’s transaction nexus.  First, the 
Rule must be “construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but 
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.’ ” 78  Second, while 
Rule 10b-5 is designed to “insure honest securities markets,”79 
its remedial purposes reach beyond that goal.80  Therefore, 
Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement can be met 
even if a “transaction is not conducted through a securities 
exchange or an organized over-the-counter market.”81  Third, 
the fraud need not relate to the price or value of a security.82
 
 76. Id. at 824. 
  
 77. Id. at 824–25.  The court also indicated, however, that Rule 10b-5 does 
not require that misappropriated assets “not have [an] independent value.” See 
id. at 824. 
 78. Id. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 151 (1972) (quoting S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 195 (1963))); see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and 
restrictively.”). 
 79. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). 
 80. See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 (“[Section] 10(b) . . . is not ‘limited to 
preserving the integrity of the securities markets’, though that purpose is 
included.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 821–22 
(noting that, although Bankers Life “recognized that the interest in ‘preserving 
the integrity of securities markets’ was one of the purposes animating [section 
10(b), it] rejected the notion that § 10(b) is limited to serving that objective 
alone.” (citing Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12)). 
 81. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10. 
 82. See id. at 12; Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822. 
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Fourth, a fraud can be “in connection with” the purchase or 
sale of securities even if the deception is not perpetrated on a 
party to the transaction.83  Finally, whether a state law 
remedy is available is irrelevant to determining the scope of 
Rule 10b-5.84
Undoubtedly, as to misappropriation cases, Rule 10b-5 
applies if a securities transaction is necessary to complete the 
fraud.
 
85  To help explain this necessity test, the Court gave 
examples of how it is limited.  Specifically, it indicated that, if 
the transaction occurs prior to the time the fraudulent 
scheme commences, the “in connection with” requirement is 
not met.86  Likewise, the Court stated, the scheme is not “in 
connection with” a securities transaction if the scheme is 
complete before the transaction occurs.87
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court intended its 
necessity test to apply outside the misappropriation context,
 
88 
but statements by the Court in Bankers Life and Zandford 
could be read to support its extension.  In Bankers Life, for 
instance, the Court described as “irrelevant . . . the fact that 
the proceeds of the sale that were due [to Manhattan] were 
misappropriated.”89
 
 83. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 (indicating that section 10(b) “requires 
deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,’ not deception of 
an identifiable purchaser or seller.”). 
  Similarly, the Court in Zandford stated 
that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] misappropriated the 
 84. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12. 
 85. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (noting that the “in connection with” 
requirement “is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not 
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without 
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell 
securities.”); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820 (“The securities sales and respondent’s 
fraudulent practices were not independent events.”); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825 
(“[T]he fraud was not complete before the sale of securities occurred.”). 
 86. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820 (noting that the fraud and the securities 
transaction are independent events when, “after a lawful transaction has been 
consummated, a broker decided to steal the proceeds and did so.”). 
 87. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The Government notes [that] . . . ‘[t]he 
misappropriation theory would . . . not apply to a case in which a person 
defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and 
then used the proceeds of the misdeed to purchase securities.”); Zandford, 535 
U.S. at 820 (noting that the fraud and the securities transaction are 
independent when “a thief simply invest[s] the proceeds of a routine conversion 
in the stock market.”). 
 88. Regardless of what the Court may have intended, lower courts have 
applied the necessity test in cases not involving misappropriation.  See infra 
notes 139–40, 159 and accompanying text. 
 89. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10. 
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proceeds of the sales provides persuasive evidence that he 
had violated section 10(b) when he made the sales, but 
misappropriation is not an essential element of the offense.”90
One might interpret the Court’s statements to suggest 
that its necessity test applies even if a fraud does not involve 
misappropriation.  A better reading, however, is a more 
general one—whether a fraud is “in connection with” a 
securities transaction does not turn on whether 
misappropriation is involved.  The misappropriation of 
proceeds from securities transactions, of course, was not 
irrelevant to the Court in Bankers Life.  Without the 
misappropriation, there would have been no fraud.  What 
Bankers Life meant by irrelevance, then, was that the mere 
fact that the fraud was a misappropriation of cash did not 
mean that there was no connection to a securities transaction.  
Zandford confirms this fact and offers a corollary, explaining 
that misappropriation is not required for a transaction to 
meet the “in connection with” requirement—that there are 
other ways for fraud and securities transactions to “coincide.” 
 
B. Uncovering Support for an Intent-Based Principle 
Even though the misappropriation test does not 
represent a clear, general principle for determining whether a 
fraud is “in connection with” a securities transaction for Rule 
10b-5 purposes, a general principle underlies the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in O’Hagan and Zandford.  When examined 
closely, the decisions suggest that the intent of the alleged 
perpetrator of the fraud is critical to determining whether the 
requisite connection exists. 
In O’Hagan, the Justice Department tried to distinguish 
O’Hagan’s trading based on misappropriated information 
regarding Grand Met’s tender offer for Pillsbury, which it 
claimed satisfied Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus 
requirement, from the use of misappropriated cash to 
purchase securities, which it acknowledged did not.91
 
 90. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822. 
  
Specifically, the government argued that the difference 
between the two scenarios is that “confidential information of 
the kind at issue [in O’Hagan] derives its value only from its 
utility in securities trading,” while “money can be used for all 
 91. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656–57. 
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manner of purposes and purchases.”92  Consequently, a 
securities transaction is necessary to complete a fraud with 
respect to the misappropriated information, but not with 
respect to misappropriated cash.93
Justice Thomas charged the government with 
exaggeration as to the information’s purported limited use.  
He observed that: 
 
O’Hagan could have done any number of things with the 
information:  He could have sold it to a newspaper for 
publication, he could have given or sold the information to 
Pillsbury itself, or he could even have kept the information 
and used it solely for his personal amusement, perhaps in 
a fantasy stock trading game. . . .  That O’Hagan actually 
did use the information to purchase securities is thus no 
more significant here than it is in the case of embezzling 
money used to purchase securities.94
According to Justice Thomas, the government’s argument 
failed its own test because a securities transaction was not 
necessary to complete a misappropriation of the information.
 
95
The majority in O’Hagan considered the government’s 
exaggeration inapposite because the information that 
O’Hagan misappropriated “ordinarily” is valuable in trading 
securities.
  
Just as in the case of embezzling money, the fraud was 
complete when the information was taken. 
96
The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort 
that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain 
no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities.  
Should a misappropriator put such information to other 
use, the statute’s prohibition would not be implicated.  
The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud 
involving confidential information; rather, it catches 
  According to the Court, 
 
 92. Id. at 657. 
 93. Id. at 656 (noting the government’s claim that, in the case of 
embezzlement of funds and subsequent use to purchase securities, “ the fraud 
would be complete as soon as the money was obtained.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 94. Id. at 685–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Under any theory of liability, 
however, these activities would not violate § 10(b) and, according to the 
Commission's monetary embezzlement analogy, these possibilities are sufficient 
to preclude a violation under the misappropriation theory even where the 
informational property was used for securities trading.”). 
 96. Id. at 657–58. 
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fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information 
through securities transactions.97
The majority’s conclusion therefore rests, not on the fact 
that the only fraud O’Hagan could have accomplished with 
the information was through a securities transaction, but on 
the fact that O’Hagan’s actual fraud was completed through a 
securities transaction.  The focus of the “in connection with” 
inquiry, then, is on whether a securities transaction was 
necessary to complete not just any fraud, but the fraud—the 
one the defendant perpetrated. 
 
Of course, the fact that the actual use of the information 
is critical to determining whether the “in connection with” 
requirement is met does not necessarily mean that the 
defendant’s intent is critical.  Following O’Hagan, one is left 
to wonder whether the “in connection with” requirement is 
met if a fiduciary deceptively takes confidential information 
for a purpose other than trading, uses it for that other 
purpose, and later decides to trade based on the information.  
Under the Court’s analysis, it seems that the fiduciary would 
have completed her misappropriation when she used the 
information for her non-trading purpose.  Would the Court 
then also find that completion of her initially-contemplated 
misappropriation is sufficient to break the transactional 
nexus even though she ultimately engaged in a securities 
transaction based on the information? 
Early in its opinion, the Court in O’Hagan suggested that 
the purpose of the misappropriation—what the defendant 
intends to do with the information—is significant.98  
Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he ‘misappropriation 
theory’ holds that a person commits fraud ‘in connection with’ 
a securities transaction, and thereby violates section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information.”99
 
 97. Id. at 656 (emphasis added). 
  Later, 
however, the Court seems to indicate that the actual use of 
 98. Id. at 652. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added);  see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 681 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority states, for example, that the misappropriation theory 
applies to undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information ‘for 
securities trading purposes,’ thus seeming to require a particular intent by the 
misappropriator in order to satisfy the ‘in connection with’ language.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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the information, and not the person’s intent, is the significant 
element for the “in connection with” requirement.  According 
to the Court, the requirement “is satisfied because the 
fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary 
gains the confidential information, but when, without 
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to 
purchase or sell securities.  The securities transaction and the 
breach of duty thus coincide.”100
Zandford, however, confirms that intent indeed is the 
critical element.  In Zandford, the Court highlighted the 
importance of the timing of Zandford’s decision to 
misappropriate funds from the Woods and what he knew 
would be necessary to do so.  According to the Court, 
  The Court’s opinion, 
therefore, is ambiguous as to whether the intent of the 
perpetrator of the fraud is critical to the “in connection with” 
requirement. 
[t]he securities sales and [Zandford’s] fraudulent practices 
were not independent events.  This is not a case in which, 
after a lawful transaction had been consummated, a 
broker decided to steal the proceeds and did so.  Nor is it a 
case in which a thief simply invested the proceeds of a 
routine conversion in the stock market.  Rather, 
[Zandford’s] fraud coincided with the sales themselves. . . . 
With regard to the sales of shares in the Woods’ mutual 
fund, [Zandford] initiated these transactions by writing a 
check to himself from that account, knowing that 
redeeming the check would require the sale of 
securities.”101
For the Court in Zandford, then, it was important that the 
defendant knew that a securities transaction was required to 
achieve his desired outcome.  It was important that the 
securities transaction was an intended part of the fraud. 
 
Thus, following Zandford, it appears that, to determine 
whether the “in connection with” requirement is met with 
respect to a misappropriation, one must define the 
defendant’s fraud by looking to the defendant’s state of mind.  
To illustrate this point, consider the following four scenarios: 
 
Scenario One:  Without her client’s knowledge or 
authorization, a broker sells $1000 of her client’s securities, 
 
 100. Id. at 656. 
 101. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820–21 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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intending to steal the proceeds.  After the sale, the broker 
steals the $1000 sale proceeds. 
 
Scenario Two:  With her client’s authorization, a broker 
sells $1000 of her client’s securities.  After the sale, the 
broker decides to steal the $1000 sale proceeds and, without 
her client’s knowledge, does so. 
 
Scenario Three:  Without Company A’s knowledge or 
authorization, an officer of Company A takes confidential 
information from Company A, intending to use it to trade in 
the securities of Company B.  After the officer takes the 
information, the officer trades in securities of Company B, 
reaping profits of $1000. 
 
Scenario Four:  Without Company A’s knowledge or 
authorization, an officer of Company A takes confidential 
information from Company A for the purpose of competing 
with Company A.  After using the information to compete 
with Company A, the officer decides to trade in the securities 
of Company B based on Company A’s information.  The officer 
trades as planned, reaping profits of $1000. 
 
The substantive result in Scenarios One and Two is the 
same—the client’s securities are sold and the broker 
wrongfully ends up with the $1000 in sale proceeds.  Under 
Zandford, however, only Scenario One satisfies the “in 
connection with” requirement.102
 
 102. Scenario One mimics Zandford’s facts.  Scenario Two represents a 
sequence of events that Zandford indicates would not satisfy the “in connection 
with” requirement.  See id. at 820 (“This is not a case in which, after a lawful 
transaction had been consummated, a broker decided to steal the proceeds and 
did so.”). 
  In a broad sense, a 
securities transaction was necessary to complete both frauds.  
Without the securities transaction, no cash would have been 
available for the broker to take.  The difference between the 
two scenarios, however—and the reason why Scenario One 
satisfies the requirement and Scenario Two does not—is one 
of intent.  In both cases, the fraud began when the broker 
decided to take the sale proceeds and ended when the broker 
actually did so.  The significant difference is that, in Scenario 
One, the transaction occurred while the broker had the intent 
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to commit the fraud and, in Scenario Two, the transaction 
already had occurred when the broker formed her intent.  In 
Scenario One, the broker’s fraudulent intent and the 
securities transaction coincided, and the broker intended the 
securities transaction as part of the fraudulent scheme. 
Like Scenarios One and Two, the substantive result in 
Scenarios Three and Four is the same—the officer takes 
Company A’s confidential information and gains $1000 in 
trading profits by trading in securities of Company B.  
Scenario Three undoubtedly satisfies the “in connection with” 
requirement under O’Hagan, and though the result for 
Scenario Four is unclear under O’Hagan, Zandford suggests 
that the requirement would not be met.  Again, the difference 
is one of intent.  In both scenarios, the fraud began when the 
officer took the information and ended when she used it for 
her intended purpose.  In Scenario Three, her intended 
purpose was to trade, and the fraud was not complete until 
she traded.  A securities transaction, therefore, was required 
to complete her fraud.  In Scenario Four, in contrast, the 
officer’s intended purpose was to compete, and the fraud was 
completed when she used the information to compete.  Her 
securities transaction occurred after her fraud was complete, 
and therefore, the fraud was not “in connection with” the 
securities transaction for purposes of Rule 10b-5. 
O’Hagan and Zandford are not the only sources of 
support for an intent-based interpretation of Rule 10b-5’s 
transactional nexus requirement.  Such an interpretation also 
finds support in the policy underpinnings of Exchange Act 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  The two principal goals of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are deterring securities fraud 
and compensating the victims of securities fraud.103  The text 
of the statute and the Rule suggests that the “in connection 
with” requirement primarily is meant to serve the deterrence 
goal.  In their essence, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 represent 
a means for civil antifraud enforcement by the SEC and 
criminal antifraud enforcement by the Department of 
Justice.104
 
 103. See Donald Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities 
Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (identifying “deterrence [and] compensatory effect” as policy 
considerations). 
  This is evident from the fact that both the statute 
 104. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 16.2[8], at 653 (“SEC investigations that 
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and the Rule describe the proscribed conduct as “unlawful”105 
and make no mention of a private cause of action.106  Because 
the statute and the Rule are written in this way, it is logical 
to read the elements that the SEC or the Department of 
Justice must prove as serving one the goals of punishment, 
which deterrence is, but compensation is not.107  
Compensation, of course, ordinarily is achieved through a 
private cause of action under the Rule.  Consequently, the 
elements unique to a private cause of action—reliance and 
causation— should be interpreted in light of that goal. 108
The transactional nexus requirement is an element 
required for civil and criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5
 
109 
and therefore should be read in a way that primarily serves 
the goal of deterrence.  An intent-based general principle for 
the requirement does just that.  A person will not be deterred 
from fraudulently influencing an investment decision110
 
reveal wrongdoing may result in SEC injunction actions brought in federal 
district court.  Alternatively, the SEC can refer the case to the Department of 
Justice to determine if criminal sanctions are appropriate.”); 15 U.S.C. § 
78u(d)(1) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to seek injunctive relief and to provide 
evidence to the Attorney General for criminal proceedings regarding violations 
of the Exchange Act); id. § 78u(d)(3) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to seek civil 
penalties for violations of the Exchange Act); id. § 78ff(a) (2006) (providing for 
fines and imprisonment for violations of the Exchange Act). 
 if she 
 105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 106. Neither the history of the statute nor the Rule suggests that Congress or 
the SEC contemplated a private cause of action.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975) (“Nor does the history of 
[section 10(b)] provide any indication that Congress considered the problem of 
private suits under it at the time of passage.  Similarly there is no indication 
that the Commission in adopting Rule 10b-5 considered the question of private 
civil remedies under this provision.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 196 (1976). (“[Section] 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil 
remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the 
Commission when it adopted Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy . . . .”). 
 107. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the 
Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of 
Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 907–08 (noting that theories of punishment 
include retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and 
general deterrence). 
 108. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting the additional 
elements that a private plaintiff must prove under Rule 10b-5). 
 109. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting that the SEC and the 
Department of Justice, as well as private plaintiffs, must meet the “in 
connection with” requirement to be successful in enforcing Rule 10b-5). 
 110. Because a purchase or sale is not required for an SEC civil enforcement 
action or for a criminal prosecution, see infra note 133 and accompanying text, 
the object of the fraud must be broader than a securities transaction.  One of the 
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should not reasonably know her actions might have that 
influence.  Extending the “in connection with” requirement 
beyond a culpable statement of mind, therefore, extends it too 
far—to a point where it no longer serves as a deterrent. 
 Although O’Hagan and Zandford, together with the 
text of Rule 10b-5, suggest an intent-based general principle 
for interpreting Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus 
requirement, other courts have used causation as a general 
principle.  For example, the Third Circuit in Semerenko v. 
Cendant Corp., a case from which the Fourth Circuit in Pirate 
Investor draws one of its factors, claimed that “the ‘in 
connection with’ language requires a causal connection 
between the claimed fraud and the purchase or sale of a 
security.”111
As indicated in Part II, the “in connection with” 
requirement is an element both of the prima facie case for 
civil or criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5 and for a private 
cause of action thereunder.  Causation, on the other hand, 
only is an element of a private cause of action.  If the “in 
connection with” requirement simply contemplates a causal 
connection, the causation element for a private cause of action 
is redundant—at least to a degree. 
  A causation-based general principle, however, is 
inconsistent with Rule 10b-5’s essence as a tool for civil 
enforcement by the SEC and criminal enforcement by the 
Department of Justice.  Moreover, it is inappropriate in light 
of the elements of Rule 10b-5’s implied private cause of 
action. 
There are two different types of causation that a private 
plaintiff must prove—reliance (or transaction causation) and 
loss causation.  The redundancy created by interpreting the 
transactional nexus to require causation largely relates to 
reliance112
 
early cases involving the “in connection with” requirement looked to the 
investing public as the relevant object.  See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Accordingly, we hold that Rule 10b-5 is 
violated whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably 
calculated to influence the investing public . . . .”). 
 and becomes apparent when one compares the 
 111. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 175 (3d Cir. 2000). The 
Seventh Circuit appears to take a similar approach.  See S.E.C. v. Jakubowski, 
150 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Many of this court’s cases say that a 
misrepresentation can be ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities 
only if it influences an investment decision.”). 
 112. Angelastro, however, suggests a causation requirement that overlaps 
with the loss causation element of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.  
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elements under Semerenko for finding a causal connection 
sufficient to establish a transactional nexus to the elements 
under Basic for a plaintiff to qualify for a presumption of 
reliance.  According to the Third Circuit in Semerenko, 
Th[e] purpose [of Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] is 
best satisfied by a rule that recognizes the realistic causal 
effect that material misrepresentations, which raise the 
public’s interest in particular securities, tend to have on 
the investment decisions of market participants who trade 
in those securities.  We therefore . . . hold that the Class 
may establish the ‘in connection with’ element simply by 
showing that the misrepresentations in question were 
disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a 
reasonable investor would rely, and that they were 
material when disseminated.113
The Supreme Court in Basic similarly stated that, “[i]ndeed, 
nearly every court that has considered the proposition has 
concluded that where materially misleading statements have 
been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market 
for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the 
integrity of the market price may be presumed.”
 
114  Thus, the 
components of Semerenko’s transactional nexus test and 
Basic’s requirement for a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
are so similar that, in most cases, if a fraud meets 
Semerenko’s “in connection with” test, the plaintiff also will 
qualify for Basic’s presumption of reliance.  Because a 
transactional nexus and reliance are separate and distinct 
elements under Rule 10b-5,115
 
Compare Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 
1985) (“As noted, this Court has construed the ‘in connection with’ language as 
requiring some causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and 
the harm incurred when a security is purchased or sold.”) with Dura Pharm., 
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (noting that a private cause of action 
under Rule 10b-5 requires a plaintiff to prove “ ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal 
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss”) (citing 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)). 
 such an overlap indicates that 
 113. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (emphasis added). 
 114. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 115. See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“Defendants’ argument treats the concepts of ‘reliance’ and ‘in connection with’ 
as interchangeable, but they are distinct.”).  The transactional nexus 
requirement and reliance must be separate elements because a transactional 
nexus is required for a civil enforcement or criminal action, but reliance is not.  
See supra notes 30–31 (distinguishing civil enforcement and criminal actions 
from private causes of action). 
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a causation-based principle for the “in connection with” 
requirement is unsuitable.116
In addition, a causation-based principle inappropriately 
focuses the transactional nexus inquiry on the plaintiff.  As 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
observed in Roland v. Green: 
 
Viewing the allegations from the plaintiffs’ perspective . . . 
asks the wrong question.  By tying the ‘coincide’ 
requirement to ‘inducement,’ it unnecessarily imports 
causation into a test whose language (‘coincide’) 
specifically disclaims it.  [A] defendant-oriented 
perspective . . . is more faithful to the Court’s statement 
[in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit] 
that ‘[t]he requisite showing . . . is deception in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of 
an identifiable purchaser or seller.117
 
 116. One might argue that Semerenko’s transactional nexus principle is 
distinct from the reliance element of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 
because satisfaction of Semerenko’s principle results only in a presumption of 
reliance and does not actually satisfy the reliance element.  See Semerenko, 223 
F.3d at 179 (“The fraud on the market theory of reliance, however, creates only 
a presumption, which the defendant may rebut by raising any defense to actual 
reliance.”).  Such an argument, however, ignores how Basic’s presumption may 
be rebutted and the practical realities of litigating a large swath of Rule 10b-5 
cases—class actions with respect to securities traded in an efficient market.  
Basic indicates that the presumption of reliance may be rebutted by “[a]ny 
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either 
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair 
market price . . . .”  Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.  If a class action defendant can sever 
the link by showing that the misrepresentation did not affect the price, then the 
misrepresentation very likely is not material and the plaintiff could not satisfy 
Semerenko’s causal connection test or qualify for Basic’s presumption because 
materiality is an element of each.  See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, 
SECURITIES REGULATION ESSENTIALS 134 (2008) (indicating that the lack of 
effect of a misrepresentation on the price of a security indicates that the 
misrepresentation is not material); see also In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (“If a company’s stock trades on an efficient 
market, . . . ‘the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc 
by looking to the movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of 
the price of the firm's stock.’ ”).  If a defendant in a class action cannot sever the 
link between the misrepresentation and the price, the defendant is left with 
trying to sever the link between the misrepresentation and the decision to 
trade, which “is not feasible to [do] for every member of the class.” CHOI & 
PRITCHARD, supra, at 135. Consequently, in a large class action with respect to 
a security traded on a national securities exchange, by qualifying for a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance, the plaintiffs, for all practical purposes, 
have established the reliance element. 
 
 117. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 519 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006)); see also 
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An intent-based general principle appropriately focuses 
the inquiry on the defendant and therefore is consistent with 
how the Supreme Court has characterized the “in connection 
with” requirement.  One might argue, however, that an 
intent-based interpretation would overlap with Rule 10b-5’s 
scienter requirement and therefore would suffer from the 
same problem a causation-based interpretation does vis-à-vis 
reliance.  As Donald Langevoort points out, however, when 
determining scienter, “the relevant question is not motive or 
purpose but awareness—[whether] the defendant [knew] . . . 
that what she was saying was false.”118  Moreover, Professor 
Langevoort suggests that, although the Second Circuit in 
AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. Ernst & Young described the 
scienter issue as one of foreseeability of the result, 
foreseeability “may not be the precise articulation” of the 
meaning of scienter because foreseeability has been the 
dominant standard for the “in connection with” 
requirement.119  Instead, he asserts, scienter encompasses 
“[a]n appreciation of the falsity by the speaker.”120  The 
element of scienter under Rule 10b-5, then, considers whether 
the defendant had the intent to deceive, defraud, or 
manipulate or knew or recklessly failed to appreciate that her 
action would have that effect;121
O’Hagan and Zandford confirm that an intent-based 
interpretation of the transactional nexus requirement does 
not result in conflating the requirement with scienter.  Under 
 it does not focus on the object 
of the intent, knowledge, or recklessness (e.g., whether an 
investment decision or something else). 
 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). (“The misappropriation 
theory comports with § 10(b)’s language, which requires deception ‘in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable 
purchaser or seller.”). 
 118. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 6.  Professor Langevoort notes that 
the district court in U.S. v. Stewart “misunderstood the law” when it dismissed 
the criminal prosecution of Martha Stewart under Rule 10b-5 because the court 
had concluded that “a reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Stewart intended to deceive investors.”  Id. at 5. 
 119. Id. at 6.  See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 221 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court focused on the defendant’s motive and 
that such a focus “inappropriately makes the scienter issue one of ‘what did the 
defendant want to happen’ as opposed to ‘what could the defendant reasonably 
foresee as a potential result of his action.’ ”). 
 120. Langevoort, supra note 103, at 6. 
 121. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (describing how courts 
have interpreted the meaning of “scienter”). 
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O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory, “a person commits fraud 
‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby 
violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities 
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of 
the information.”122  Therefore, under O’Hagan, a person 
violates Rule 10b-5 when he or she has both an intent to 
deceive and an intent to trade.  If a person discloses to the 
source of the information his or her intent to trade, Rule 10b-
5 is not violated because the person does not have the intent 
to deceive, and does not deceive, the source.123  The person’s 
intent to trade, however, persists.  Moreover, Zandford 
indicates that “if [a] broker told his client he was stealing the 
client’s assets, that breach of fiduciary duty might be in 
connection with a sale of securities, but it would not involve a 
deceptive device or fraud.”124
Thus, based on O’Hagan and Zandford, a defendant’s 
state of mind is significant with respect to two separate 
elements.  The defendant’s intent to deceive is important to 
scienter, and the defendant’s intent to engage in a securities 
transaction or to take an action that the defendant knows will 
require a securities transaction is critical to the “in 
connection with” requirement. 
  Again, there would be no intent 
to deceive or actual deception, but the defendant’s intent to 
trade would remain. 
C. A Workable Intent-Based Principle 
Determining that satisfaction of Rule 10b-5’s “in 
connection with” requirement should be measured based on 
the intent of the perpetrator of the fraud is only a starting 
point.  For courts to apply the Rule’s transactional nexus 
requirement in a meaningful and consistent manner, they 
must have more than just a vague notion of what the 
requirement means.  To craft a workable general principle 
based on intent, two components should be considered: first, 
what constitutes intent and, second, what the object of the 
 
 122. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 123. Id. at 655 (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation 
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary 
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, 
there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”). 
 124. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002).  
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intent is.  As discussed below, case law supports a scienter-
like definition of intent, and influencing an investment 
decision as the object of that intent. 
 In trying to articulate an intent-based principle for 
Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement, the logical 
place to look is Rule 10b-5’s other element to which state of 
mind is relevant—scienter.  O’Hagan’s adoption of the 
misappropriation theory for insider trading indicates that 
Rule 10b-5 can apply even in the unusual case when a 
defendant’s intent is divided—when the defendant intends to 
deceive one person and intends to engage in a securities 
transaction with another.125  In most cases, however, a 
defendant’s intent will not be divided.  Typically, the person 
the defendant intends to deceive will be the very same person 
the defendant intends to influence with respect to a securities 
transaction.  In light of this fact, it is reasonable to interpret 
the scope of the “in connection with” requirement in a manner 
consistent with the scope of the scienter requirement.  
Indeed, although Professor Langevoort notes that the 
meaning of scienter is distinct from the “in connection with” 
requirement, he approvingly states that, by using for scienter 
a standard commonly associated with the “in connection with” 
requirement, the Second Circuit in AUSA had “conjoin[ed] the 
scienter and ‘in connection with’ tests in a way that makes 
holistic sense in defining what constitutes securities fraud.”126
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court’s landmark case 
establishing scienter as a required element for a private 
cause of action under Rule 10b-5,
 
127 the Court stated that 
“[t]he words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction 
with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was 
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.”128
 
 125. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“A misappropriator who trades on the 
basis of material, nonpublic information . . . deceives the source of the 
information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.”). 
  
As a result, knowledge and specific intent should be 
 126. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 6. 
 127. In Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court determined that scienter also is 
required for SEC enforcement actions.  Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 691 
(1980); see HAZEN, supra  note 6, § 12.8[1], at 457 (“The Supreme Court . . . held 
in Aaron v. SEC that the scienter standard applies under Rule 10b-5 regardless 
of whether the action is one for damages or an enforcement action brought by 
the Commission.”). 
 128. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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components of the defendant’s state of mind for purposes of 
the “in connection with” requirement.  This conclusion is 
consistent with the facts of the Supreme Court’s three “in 
connection with” cases.  In Bankers Life, the defendants 
intended to influence the decision of Manhattan’s board of 
directors to authorize the sale of Manhattan’s Treasury 
bonds.129  Likewise, the defendant in O’Hagan intended to 
engage in securities transactions based on the confidential 
information he misappropriated.130  Finally, in Zandford, the 
defendant wrote checks on his clients’ account, knowing that 
a securities transaction would be required to fund the 
checks.131
Whether the state of mind applicable to the transactional 
nexus requirement should extend to recklessness is unclear 
from the Court’s “in connection with” cases, but the Courts of 
Appeals generally have recognized recklessness as a 
component of scienter.
 
132  In addition, the Third Circuit in 
Semerenko and In re Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock 
Litigation addressed recklessness in its consideration of the 
“in connection with” requirement.  In Semerenko, the court 
stated that “under the standard which we adopt [for the 
transactional nexus requirement], the [plaintiffs are] not 
required to establish that the defendants actually envisioned 
that [the plaintiffs] would rely upon the alleged 
misrepresentations when making their investment decisions.  
Rather, [they] must only show that the alleged 
misrepresentations were reckless.”133
 
 129. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 7–9 
(1971) (describing a deliberate scheme to mislead the directors). 
  Similarly, in rejecting 
 130. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (noting that information of the type that 
O’Hagan misappropriated “ordinarily” is useful only for reaping trading profits). 
 131. See S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 821 (2002) (“With regard to the 
sales of shares in the Woods’ mutual fund, respondent initiated these 
transactions by writing a check to himself from that account, knowing that 
redeeming the check would require the sale of securities.”). 
 132. See Findwhat Investor Grp. v. Findwhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“In this Circuit, ‘scienter consists of intent to defraud or severe 
recklessness on the part of the defendant.’ ”); Mississippi Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. 
v. Boston Scientific Corp., 649 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Under this circuit's 
precedent, proving scienter requires ‘a showing of either conscious intent to 
defraud or a high degree of recklessness.’ ”); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 
F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Scienter may be satisfied by either proof of 
actual knowledge or recklessness.”); see also supra note 26 (citing cases 
recognizing that recklessness is a component of scienter). 
 133. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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the defendants’ argument that they must have envisioned the 
impact of their statements on investors for the statements to 
have the requisite connection, the court in Ames stated that 
the defendants had disregarded “the well-established rule 
that reckless, as well as intentional, manipulation of the 
stock market may violate Rule 10b-5.”134  Thus, it seems 
appropriate to include recklessness as a component state of 
mind for purposes of the “in connection with” requirement.135
For purposes of the “in connection with” requirement, the 
object of the defendant’s intent must be broader than a 
purchase or sale.  This is so because Rule 10b-5’s purchase or 
sale requirement only applies to standing with respect to a 
private cause of action.
 
136  Neither a purchase nor a sale is 
required for civil enforcement by the SEC or criminal 
prosecution by the Department of Justice.137
 
 134. In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig. 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 
1993) Semerenko and Ames are interesting because, in one breath, they purport 
to establish a causation-based standard for the “in connection with” 
requirement and, in another, they discuss intent and the fact that reckless 
conduct can violate Rule 10b-5.  See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (noting that a 
causal connection serves the purposes of Rule 10b-5 and then discussing 
recklessness); Ames, 991 F.2d at 965–66 (discussing recklessness and then 
noting that “statements which manipulate the market price are connected to 
resultant stock trading”).  It is unclear, however, whether these cases are 
merely referring to the Rule’s scienter requirement or are incorporating an 
intent element into their “in connection with” tests.  Although Semerenko cites 
In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.’s discussion of scienter, the court seems to 
suggest that recklessness need only be shown “under the standard which we 
adopt” for the “in connection with” requirement.  See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 
176 (citing In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
Ames mentions scienter specifically, perhaps indicating only that its “in 
connection with” rule should be considered with the separate scienter element 
in mind.  See Ames, 991 F.2d at 965 n.6. 
  Bearing this in 
 135. Although reckless conduct may satisfy both elements, what constitutes 
recklessness may be different under each.  For example, Professor Langevoort 
suggests that “[a]n appreciation of the falsity by the speaker is all that is 
necessary” for scienter, while foreseeability is the prevailing standard used by 
courts for the “in connection with” requirement.  Langevoort, supra note 103, at 
6. 
 136. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that a private cause of 
action requires a purchase or sale). 
 137. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 n.14 
(1975) (“[T]he purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the standing of the 
SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 664 (1997). (“Criminal prosecutions do not 
present the dangers the Court addressed in Blue Chip Stamps, so that decision 
is ‘inapplicable’ to indictments for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); S.E.C. 
v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (“While interpretations 
of ‘in connection with’ continue to change as applied to private plaintiffs, its 
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mind, in light of Rule 10b-5’s definition of materiality,138 
which focuses on the importance of information to an 
investor’s decision, and taking into account how a number of 
lower courts have interpreted the “in connection with” 
requirement,139
Based on the foregoing, then, one might articulate a 
suitable principle as follows:  for purposes of Rule 10b-5, a 
fraud is “in connection with” a securities transaction only 
when the perpetrator of the fraud intends to influence, or 
knows or is reckless in not knowing that his or her actions 
could influence, an investment decision.  Such a principle 
appropriately employs scienter-like intent and sets an 
investment decision as its object.
 an investment decision is the proper object of 
a defendant’s intent for purposes of the Rule 10-5’s 
transactional nexus requirement. 
140
III. PIRATE INVESTOR’S MULTIFACTOR TEST 
 
In Pirate Investor, the Fourth Circuit considered whether 
an e-mail stock tip containing misrepresentations violated 
 
meaning in SEC actions remains as broad and flexible as is necessary to 
accomplish the statute’s purpose of protecting investors.”) (citing S.E.C. v. 
Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); S.E.C. v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 
1122, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); S.E.C. v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Fla. 
1987); S.E.C. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Wis. 
1978); S.E.C. v. Gen. Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1257 (D.D.C. 1975)). 
 138. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (adopting the 
materiality standard from TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
448–49 (1976), which focuses on the importance of information to an investor’s 
decision making). 
 139. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(“[W]e hold that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as here, 
in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public . . . .”); 
United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he misrepresentations were made to influence UIH's investment 
decision and were made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”); 
S.E.C. v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “only 
investment decisions come within Rule 10b-5.”). 
 140. One might argue this principle is not broad enough to capture insider 
trading under the misappropriation theory in which the defendant does not seek 
to influence an investment decision by the person from whom she takes the 
information or the investment decision of the person on the other side of her 
trade.  The Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Jakubowski, however, has suggested that 
influencing the investment decision of the perpetrator of the fraud is sufficient 
for the “in connection with” requirement.  See Jakubowski, 150 F.3d at 680 
(“Jakubowski . . . made [an] investment decision[] when [he] purchased the 
stock issued by the converting S&Ls.”). 
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Rule 10b-5.141  In May 2002, the editor-in-chief of Pirate 
Investor, LLC, a publisher of investment newsletters, sent 
multiple waves of e-mails containing a stock tip to over 
800,000 individuals.142  The e-mails suggested that, based on 
information purportedly obtained from a senior executive of a 
mystery company, the editor knew that the mystery company 
was going to announce a major transaction on May 22 and 
that investors could profit from buying the mystery 
company’s stock prior to that time.143  The e-mails further 
indicated that, for $1000, an e-mail recipient could receive a 
special report divulging the name of the mystery company.144  
Pirate received over $600,000 from sales of the special report 
to over 1200 investors.145  Unfortunately for those who 
purchased the report and then purchased the stock of the 
mystery company, May 22 came and went without any 
announcement and it turned out that a mystery company 
senior executive had not told Pirate’s editor that the 
transaction was to be announced on that date.146
To analyze whether the misrepresentations in Pirate’s e-
mails were “in connection with” a securities transaction for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5, the Fourth Circuit applied a 
multifactor test that focused on four factors that the court 
indicated are neither mandatory nor exhaustive, but rather 
serve as a guide.
 
147
factors include, but are not limited to: (1) whether a 
securities sale was necessary to the completion of the 
fraudulent scheme; (2) whether the parties’ relationship 
was such that it would necessarily involve trading in 
securities; (3) whether the defendant intended to induce a 
securities transaction; and (4) whether material 
misrepresentations were disseminated to the public in a 
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely.
  According to the court, the 
148
 
 
 
 141. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 142. Id. at 237–39. 
 143. Id. at 238. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 239.  The opinion does not explain why Pirate received only a 
portion of the total net proceeds from the sales.  See id. (noting that Pirate 
received only $626,500 of the total net proceeds of $1,005,000). 
 146. Id. at 240. 
 147. Id. at 244. 
 148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The first factor, of course, is Zandford’s misappropriation 
test.149  The second factor is from the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc. 150  The Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in United International Holdings, Inc. v. 
Wharf (Holdings), Inc. supports the third factor.151  And the 
final factor is drawn from Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 
another Third Circuit case. 152
The Fourth Circuit considered the various factors one-by-
one, ultimately finding that Pirate’s misrepresentations were 
“in connection with” the purchase or sale of security.
 
153
A. Securities Sale Necessary to Complete the Fraud 
  
Although the court’s conclusion was correct, it applied the 
factors indiscriminately, without reflection on what the 
factors measure or how they should apply.  If, instead, the 
Fourth Circuit had used the intent-based principle described 
in Part II.C to construct and apply its test, the court would 
have reached the right conclusion more logically and 
efficiently.  An examination of the cases supporting each 
factor in the Pirate Investor framework and of the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis with respect to each factor reveals where 
the court went wrong and how its multifactor test can be 
improved and better applied. 
The Fourth Circuit looked to Zandford’s 
misappropriation test—whether a securities transaction is 
necessary to complete the fraud—for its first factor and, 
considering the factor relative to the facts in Pirate Investor, 
determined that the factor weighed in favor of finding that 
Pirate’s misrepresentations were “in connection with” a 
securities transaction.  The court explained that Pirate sent 
out its e-mail in multiple waves.154
 
 149. Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820–21 (2002)).  
  According to the court, the 
e-mails in later waves touted stock purchases by investors 
who had received earlier e-mails and highlighted the fact that 
the mystery company’s stock price had risen, which the 
 150. Id. (citing Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 302–
03 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 151. Id. (citing United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 
1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 152. Id. (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 
2000)).  
 153. Id. at 252. 
 154. Id. at 245. 
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district court found resulted from the earlier purchases.155  
Based on these facts, the court concluded that “[t]he fraud 
was not complete when investors paid $1,000 to learn the 
identity of the company in question; [the defendants] also 
needed those investors to purchase the stock thereby 
increasing the stock price so as to boost the credibility of the 
solicitation e-mail to obtain more $1,000 payments.”156
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the first factor is a bit 
contrived.  While it may be true that Pirate benefited from 
actual purchases of the mystery company’s stock, by no 
means were the purchases necessary to complete the fraud.  
The fraud with respect to each investor was complete when 
the investor paid for the special report that revealed the 
identity of the mystery company.  Unlike the 
misappropriation in Zandford, no intervening securities 
transaction was necessary to complete the fraud.  Purchases 
by earlier investors may have aided Pirate in defrauding later 
investors, but purchases of the special reports by later 
investors could have been completed without anyone’s having 
made a purchase. 
 
To reach the conclusion that securities transactions were 
necessary to complete the fraud, the Fourth Circuit stretched 
to characterize the “fraudulent scheme” as broadly as 
possible.  Even when using such a broad characterization, the 
court struggled to conclude that purchases of the mystery 
company’s securities were necessary to complete Pirate’s 
fraud.  In various places, the court stated that the defendants 
“benefit[ted] from securities trading by the purchasers of 
[Pirate’s] Special Report,” that “the rising stock was 
important to the success of the scheme,” and that “securities 
transactions helped [the defendants] to maximize the 
profitability of their scheme.”157  In only one place, however, 
did the court indicate that the defendants needed the 
securities transactions, and even there, the necessity wasn’t 
to complete the fraud, but to “increase[e] the stock price so as 
to boost the credibility of the solicitation e-mail.”158
 
 155. Id. at 245–46. 
  
Furthermore, whether securities transactions actually would 
have boosted the credibility of the e-mails is subject to some 
 156. Id. at 246. 
 157. Id. at 245–47 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 246. 
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question.  After all, the e-mails did not give the name of the 
mystery company and therefore recipients had no way to 
confirm the truth of what the e-mail stated about changes in 
the stock price. 
The Fourth Circuit went astray with the first factor by 
applying it too rigidly.  The Supreme Court has not suggested 
that the Zandford test ought to apply outside the 
misappropriation context, and the Fourth Circuit’s tortured 
analysis suggests that it ought not be.  The court in Pirate 
Investor failed to acknowledge that Zandford was a 
misappropriation case, that Pirate Investor was not, and that 
the applicability of a test may depend on context. 
None of this is to say that the Fourth Circuit’s 
considerations with respect to the first factor were without 
merit.  Facts indicating that a defendant benefitted from 
misstatements or omissions certainly are relevant to 
determining whether the defendant intended to influence an 
investment decision.  The lesson from Pirate Investor’s 
application of the first factor is that the Zandford test should 
be limited to misappropriation cases and, outside the 
misappropriation context, courts ought to use a more broadly 
tailored factor such as whether the defendant benefited from 
the misstatements or omissions. 
B. Parties’ Relationship Such That It Necessarily Involves 
Securities Trading 
Pirate Investor cites Rowinski in support of its second 
factor—“whether the parties’ relationship was such that it 
would necessarily involve trading in securities.”159  In 
Rowinski, the Third Circuit considered whether State law 
claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 
violations of state consumer protection laws were preempted 
under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998160 (SLUSA).161  SLUSA, under certain conditions, 
preempts State law class actions with respect to fraud “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of” securities.162
 
 159. Id. at 244. 
  In 
 160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2006). 
 161. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 
2005)). 
 162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (emphasis added).  Congress enacted 
SLUSA to curb State-law class action lawsuits with respect to nationally traded 
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evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims in Rowinski, the Third 
Circuit applied precedent with respect to the “in connection 
with” requirement under Rule 10b-5.163
The plaintiffs in Rowinski, retail brokerage customers of 
Salomon Smith Barney (SSB), alleged that SSB had produced 
investment research reports that reflected overly favorable 
views of its investment banking clients in order to “reap 
hundreds of millions of dollars of investment banking fees” 
from those clients.
  Therefore, Rowinski 
was a reasonable place for the Fourth Circuit to look in 
creating its test. 
164  The plaintiffs accordingly sought to 
recover, together with other damages, brokerage fees paid by 
them to SSB.165
Pirate Investor cites Rowinski in support of a single 
factor, but the Third Circuit in fact employed its own 
multifactor “flexible framework” to determine whether the 
alleged misrepresentations met the “in connection with” 
 
 
securities that began to arise after Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).  15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 and 78u-4; Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006).  In the 
PSLRA, Congress adopted a number of measures designed to curtail abuses in 
federal antifraud class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities.  
Id. at 81.  Among other things, PSLRA established stringent pleading 
requirements, limited damages and attorney’s fees, allowed discovery to be 
stayed until any motion to dismiss was resolved, and penalized those bringing 
frivolous lawsuits.  Id. 81–82.  After PSLRA was enacted, plaintiffs started 
bringing securities class actions under State law to avoid PSLRA’s restrictions.  
Id. at 82.  SLUSA was designed to stop the proliferation of these lawsuits by 
providing for federal preemption of State law class actions brought on behalf of 
over 50 people in which a plaintiff alleges “a misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security” or 
“that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (emphasis added).  For purposes of SLUSA, a “covered 
security” is “one traded nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange.”  
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 83. 
 163. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299.  Other courts have found that “ ‘in connection 
with the purchase or sale’ of a security under SLUSA covers the same range of 
activities that the SEC could prosecute as violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”  
Instituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 
2008); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008); see 
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (considering the meaning of “in connection with” in 
SLUSA and indicating that “when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the 
meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in 
[a] new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . 
judicial interpretations as well.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
 164. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 296–97. 
 165. Id. at 297. 
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requirement.166
first, whether the . . . class action allege[d] a ‘fraudulent 
scheme’ that ‘coincides’ with the purchase or sale of 
securities; second, whether the complaint allege[d] a 
material misrepresentation or omission ‘disseminated to 
the public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor 
would rely;’ [and] third, whether the nature of the parties’ 
relationship is such that it necessarily involves the 
purchase or sale of securities . . . .
  The factors in the Third Circuit’s framework 
included: 
167
The court concluded that all three factors
 
168 supported 
preemption of the plaintiffs’ claims under SLUSA.  First, the 
court found that securities transactions coincided with the 
fraud as contemplated by Zandford because the transactions 
were necessary to the success of the alleged fraud.169  The 
court reasoned that, without the purchases, the share prices 
of SSB’s investment banking clients would not increase and, 
without increases in share prices, the clients would not 
benefit and “pay” SSB for that benefit by giving SSB 
investment banking business.170  Second, without much 
discussion, the court determined that an investment research 
report represented a “medium upon which a reasonable 
investor would rely.”171  Finally, and again with little 
elaboration, the court found that the essential purpose of a 
broker/investor relationship is to engage in securities 
transactions.172
The Third Circuit cited its prior decision in Angelastro v. 
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. to support its consideration 
of and conclusion regarding the final factor—the factor that 
Pirate Investor drew from Rowinski.
 
173
 
 166. Id. at 302. 
  In Angelastro, the 
Third Circuit considered whether a broker’s alleged 
misrepresentations and nondisclosures with respect to the 
 167. Id. (citations omitted). 
 168. The court also considered “whether the prayer for relief ‘connect[ed]’ the 
state law claims to the purchase or sale of securities.”  Id.  This factor is 
relevant to whether a particular fraud is “in connection with” a securities 
transaction for purposes of SLUSA, but does not make sense in the context of 
Rule 10b-5. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 303. 
 173. Id. at 302–03. 
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terms of a margin account met Rule 10b-5’s transactional 
nexus requirement.174  The plaintiff claimed that Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc. had failed to disclose completely and 
accurately its margin account terms, including the interest 
rate to be charged and how interest charges would be 
computed,175 and that these misrepresentations and 
omissions “induced her” to purchase securities on margin in 
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.176
In considering whether Bache’s alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions were “in connection with” a 
securities transaction, the Third Circuit noted that it 
previously had interpreted the “touching” concept set out in 
Bankers Trust as requiring a causal connection.
 
177  Such a 
causal connection, the court observed, can exist in the context 
of a course of dealing in securities and need not involve the 
value of particular securities.178  The court limited its holding, 
however, noting the danger in adopting a rule under which 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that would encompass every loan 
transaction that happened to involve securities.179
Angelastro supports consideration of the context in which 
a fraud occurs for purposes of the “in connection with” 
requirement, but more significantly indicates how that 
context should be considered.  Importantly, the Third Circuit 
in Angelastro was addressing a motion to dismiss and, based 
on the context of the alleged fraud (i.e., a brokerage 
relationship), only determined that it could not conclude, as a 
matter of law, that a causal connection did not exist between 
the alleged fraud and securities transactions.
 
180
 
 174. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
  The court did 
 175. Id. at 944. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 943. 
 178. Id. at 944; see also id. at 943 (noting that courts have determined that 
churning claims are within the ambit of Rule 10b-5 and churning “does not 
concern the merits of the individual securities bought and sold but rather the 
excessiveness of the number of transactions in the aggregate.”). 
 179. See id. at 945 (“Our holding . . . does not mean that every loan 
transaction in which a pledge of securities is involved or every bank loan for the 
purpose of purchasing securities is necessarily within the purview of section 
10(b).”). 
 180. Id. (“We therefore reject Bache’s assertion that, as a matter of law, 
plaintiff could prove no set of facts to demonstrate a connection between the 
credit terms of a margin account and her decision to purchase securities on 
margin.”). 
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not find that, because the relationship involved the trading of 
securities, the fraud met the “in connection with” 
requirement.  In fact, the court was very clear that 
consideration of the context in which a fraud occurs should 
not be taken too far: 
We agree that there is a danger in construing the ‘in 
connection with’ requirement so broadly that virtually any 
type of misconduct related to a securities transaction even 
in the most tenuous or tangential way might be claimed to 
give rise to a federal securities law violation. . . .  Our 
holding that the misrepresentations alleged by Angelastro 
regarding her margin account are cognizable under Rule 
10b-5 does not mean that every loan transaction in which 
a pledge of securities is involved or every bank loan for the 
purpose of purchasing securities is necessarily within the 
purview of section 10(b).181
For Angelastro, then, context was significant only to the 
extent that it evidenced a “causal connection between the 
alleged misrepresentation and the harm incurred when a 
security is purchased or sold.”
 
182
In Pirate Investor, the Fourth Circuit determined that 
the relationships involved did not necessitate securities 
transactions, and therefore the second factor of its test did not 
weigh in favor of finding that the fraud was “in connection 
with” a securities transaction.  The defendants in Pirate 
Investor were merely selling advice; the decision to purchase 
securities entirely was in the hands of the recipients of the e-
mails.
 
183  Accordingly, the court noted that the relationship 
between Pirate and the recipients differed from the brokerage 
relationship in Zandford, whose “very purpose . . . [was] 
trading in securities.”184
Significantly, the holding in Zandford was not based on 
the context in which the fraud occurred.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court in Zandford was very clear that context itself is not 
dispositive.  The Court noted specifically that, “[i]f, for 
example, a broker embezzles cash from a client’s account or 
takes advantage of the fiduciary relationship to induce his 
client into a fraudulent real estate transaction, then the fraud 
 
 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 944. 
 183. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 247 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 184. Id. at 247. 
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would not include the requisite connection to a purchase or 
sale of securities.”185
The Fourth Circuit was right to include consideration of 
the relationship between the applicable parties as a factor in 
its test.  As Angelastro suggests and Zandford confirms, 
however, the parties’ relationship is relevant only to the 
extent that it sheds light on the general principle governing 
the “in connection with” requirement.  Accordingly, Pirate 
Investor’s second factor is important only to the extent that it 
indicates whether the perpetrator of the fraud intended to 
influence, or knew or was reckless in not knowing that his or 
her actions could influence, an investment decision. 
  This conduct the Court described is not 
actionable under Rule 10b-5 notwithstanding the fact the 
relationship between the broker and the client is one that 
necessarily involves trading in securities. 
C. Defendant Induced Securities Transaction 
Pirate Investor cites United International Holdings, Inc. 
v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.186 in support of its third factor—
“whether the defendant intended to induce a securities 
transaction.”187  In Wharf, United International Holdings, Inc. 
(UIH) alleged that Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. had made 
representations that induced UIH to purchase from Wharf an 
option to purchase stock in a company that would operate a 
cable television system in Hong Kong.188
Wharf asserted that the alleged misrepresentations 
related to Wharf’s intent to sell the stock subject to the option 
and that such misrepresentations did not meet the “in 
connection with” requirement under Rule 10b-5.
 
189  The Tenth 
Circuit disagreed, citing precedent that found a valid Rule 
10b-5 claim when a party agrees to sell a security while 
holding a “secret reservation” not to do so.190
 
 185. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002). 
  According to the 
 186. United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207 (10th 
Cir. 2000). 
 187. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244. 
 188. Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1214, 1221. 
 189. Id. at 1221. 
 190. Id. (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Secs. Litig., 881 F.3d 1236, 1245 n.13 
(3d Cir. 1989); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986); Threadgill v. 
Black, 730 F.2d. 810, 811–12 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 
F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1971); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp. 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 
(2d Cir. 1993)). 
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court, “[i]t is a party’s secret reservation not to fully perform a 
securities contract that distinguishes these cases from routine 
breach of contract and common law fraud cases and brings 
them within the scope of Rule 10b-5.”191  The court observed 
that “[Wharf’s] representations allegedly were made to induce 
UIH to purchase the option” and found that, as a 
consequence, “the misrepresentations were made to influence 
UIH’s investment decision and were made in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security.”192
The court in Pirate Investor determined that the 
defendants intended to induce securities trades and therefore 
the third factor in Pirate Investor’s test indicated that Pirate’s 
misrepresentations were “in connection with” securities 
transactions.
 
193  In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth 
Circuit focused on two facts.  First, the defendants benefitted 
from securities purchases, and second, the special report, 
which was provided after the investors paid $1000, repeated 
claims about the mystery company’s major transaction and 
the timing of its announcement and “called upon investors to 
‘call your broker now and tell him to buy shares of [the 
mystery company].’ ”194
Just as it did with respect to its first factor, the Fourth 
Circuit had to stretch to conclude that the defendants 
intended to induce a securities transaction.  The court didn’t 
need to do so.  In Wharf, the Tenth Circuit determined that, if 
the defendant intended to induce a securities transaction, it 
by definition met the applicable and broader principle that 
the fraud was intended to influence an investment decision.
 
195
Again, the Fourth Circuit’s focus on the benefit to the 
defendants is an important consideration.  With the 
  
At bottom, the Fourth Circuit’s third factor is just a narrower 
definition of an intent-based interpretation of the “in 
connection with” requirement.  With the broader principle 
articulated in Part II.C., the court’s third factor is 
unnecessary. 
 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1221 (“The representations allegedly were made 
to induce UIH to purchase the option. As such, the misrepresentations were 
made to influence UIH’s investment decision and were made in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security.”). 
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modification proposed to the first factor of the Pirate Investor 
test, benefit will be taken into account in determining 
whether the perpetrator of the fraud intended to influence, or 
knew or was reckless in not knowing that his or her actions 
could influence, an investment decision. 
Although Pirate Investor’s third factor is redundant when 
coupled with the general principle from Part II.C, the court’s 
analysis with respect to the factor suggests an additional 
factor: “whether, through written or spoken words or other 
conduct, the defendant encouraged a securities transaction.”  
The language in Pirate’s special report urging investors to 
call their brokers and ask them to purchase stock in the 
mystery company certainly suggests that Pirate intended to 
influence the recipients’ investment decisions.  Considering 
the presence or absence of similar language in other cases 
will assist courts in gauging whether a defendant had the 
requisite intent to satisfy Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus 
requirement. 
D. Misrepresentations Disseminated in a Medium Upon 
Which a Reasonable Investor Would Rely 
Pirate Investor looked to Semerenko v. Cendant Corp. to 
support its final factor—“whether material 
misrepresentations were ‘disseminated to the public in a 
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely.’ ”196  In 
Semerenko, the Third Circuit considered whether alleged 
misrepresentations made by an acquiring company in a 
tender offer were “in connection with” purchases and sales of 
the target’s common stock.197  In 1998, Cendant Corp. 
commenced a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of 
common stock of American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. 
(ABI).198  After two bids, Cendant entered into an agreement 
to acquire ABI for a combination of cash and common stock.199
Shortly after entering into the agreement, Cendant 
disclosed possible accounting irregularities affecting its 
earnings for the previous fiscal year and announced that an 
 
 
 196. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244 (quoting Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 
223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (“public dissemination of information in a 
medium upon which an investor would presumably rely”)). 
 197. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 169. 
 198. Id. at 170. 
 199. Id. 
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independent investigation of the problems was to be 
conducted.200  In a letter to Cendant’s shareholders following 
the announcement, Cendant’s chairman and its chief 
executive officer indicated that Cendant was committed to 
completing the ABI acquisition.201  The company later 
announced that the effect on its prior year earnings would be 
more than double its original estimate and that it had 
detected additional irregularities affecting other fiscal 
years.202  Nevertheless, Cendant continued to make public 
statements indicating that it remained committed to 
acquiring ABI.203  After the full effect of the irregularities was 
disclosed, however, Cendant terminated its agreement to 
acquire ABI.204  In a class action lawsuit filed the day after 
Cendant terminated the agreement, shareholders who 
purchased ABI shares between the time Cendant made its 
first tender offer bid and the time it terminated its agreement 
with AGI claimed that Cendant, former officers and directors 
of the company, and Ernst & Young, the company’s auditor, 
had violated Rule 10b-5 by misrepresenting Cendant’s 
financial condition and its commitment to acquiring ABI.205
In considering whether the alleged misrepresentations 
met Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement, the Third 
Circuit acknowledged that, in Angelastro, it had required a 
“causal connection between the claimed fraud and the 
purchase or sale of a security.”
 
206  Bearing that in mind, the 
court held that, when misrepresentations are publicly 
disseminated into an efficient market, a plaintiff may meet 
the “in connection with” requirement “simply by showing that 
the misrepresentations in question were disseminated to the 
public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor would 
rely, and that they were material when disseminated.”207  
Moreover, the court explained that the standard can be met 
even if the person making the misrepresentation did not 
intend to influence an investment decision.208
 
 200. Id.  
  “Rather, [the 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at 171. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 169, 171. 
 206. Id. at 175. 
 207. Id. at 176. 
 208. Id.  
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plaintiff] must only show that the . . . misrepresentation[] 
[was] reckless.”209  As to an accountant’s liability, the Third 
Circuit held that the plaintiff must make an additional 
showing that the defendant knew or had reason to know that 
the applicable financial statements and the related audit 
reports would be used in a securities transaction.210  The 
court established these transactional nexus standards, but 
stopped there, noting that it needed to remand the case 
because the standards it articulated were different from the 
standard the district court had applied.211
The Third Circuit in Semerenko indicated that it was 
adopting a standard like the one adopted by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ames and by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
McGann v. Ernst & Young with respect to publicly 
disseminated information.
 
212  In In re Ames Department 
Stores Inc. Stock Litigation, the Second Circuit considered 
whether alleged misrepresentations made in offering 
documents for an issuer’s debt offerings were “in connection 
with” transactions in the issuer’s common stock for purposes 
of Rule 10b-5.213  Ames Department Stores, Inc. acquired a 
division of Zayre Corporation in 1988.214  Although Ames was 
having difficulty integrating the Zayre division into the 
company, Ames made statements in offering documents for 
two debt offerings that indicated the integration was going 
well.215  In addition, the offering documents included positive 
statements about Ames’s financial condition following the 
acquisition.216  Ames ultimately filed for bankruptcy.217
 
 209. Id.  
 
 210. Id. at 177. 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. at 176. 
 213. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 961 (2d Cir. 
1993) (noting that the district court had considered whether alleged 
misrepresentations in prospectuses for reset notes and debentures could serve 
as the basis for Rule 10b-5 liability with respect to stock purchases). 
 214. Id. at 955. 
 215. Id. at 958–60. 
 216. See id. at 958 (indicating that the 1989 annual report, which was 
incorporated by reference in the reset note prospectus, predicted a 150% 
increase in sales); see also id. at 959–60 (stating that the prospectus for the 
debentures indicated that Ames had reduced overhead, “reassured investors 
that anticipated strong sales . . . would enable Ames to meet its selling goals” in 
the holiday season, and asserted that its revolving credit facility was sufficient 
to meet its working capital and capital expenditure needs). 
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Looking to the flexible standard cited in Bankers Life and 
to its earlier decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the 
Second Circuit determined that misrepresentations made in 
the offering documents for Ames’s debt securities could 
operate as a fraud subject to Rule 10b-5 with respect to 
transactions in Ames’s common stock.218  The court noted 
that, under Texas Gulf Sulphur’s test, to be “in connection 
with” a securities transaction, a fraudulent device needed to 
be of a type on which reasonable investors would rely and 
which, in such reliance, would cause them to purchase or sell 
securities.219  Observing that Texas Gulf Sulphur’s “in 
connection with” test was akin to its test for materiality, the 
Second Circuit in Ames suggested that “any material 
information issued by a corporation (whose securities are 
publicly traded) has appropriate ‘connection’ to constitute a 
10b-5 violation if the information is misleading.”220  The court 
noted, moreover, that the offering documents for Ames’s debt 
securities were just the type of documents that a reasonable 
investor would use to evaluate an investment in the 
company’s common stock.221
The court in Ames rejected the defendants’ argument 
that Texas Gulf Sulphur required, for fraudulent statements 
to be “in connection with” a securities transaction, that an 
effect on investor decision-making be “not only reasonably 
foreseeable, but also envisioned by the company.”
 
222  In so 
doing, the Third Circuit noted that not only intentional 
conduct, but also reckless conduct, is proscribed by Rule 10b-
5.223
 
 217. Id. at 961. 
 
 218. Id. at 964–65 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 
404 U.S. 6 (1971) and S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1968); see id. at 961 (indicating that the district court had incorrectly “construed 
the ‘in connection with’ requirement as requiring that the [mis]statements be 
made in the registration statements for the particular stock at issue”).  The 
plaintiffs in Ames also alleged that misstatements had been made in various 
publicly disseminated statements, such as press releases and periodic SEC 
filings, but the district court only considered the documents associated with the 
debt offerings.  See id. at 968.  The Second Circuit indicated that the alleged 
misstatements in those publicly disseminated documents would support a Rule 
10b-5 cause of action even if the debt offering documents did not.  Id.  
 219. Id. at 965. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. 
 223. Id.  
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In McGann v. Ernst & Young, the Ninth Circuit 
considered whether an auditing firm that knew its audit 
opinion would be included in a client’s Form 10-K could be 
liable under Rule 10b-5 with respect to the opinion.224  Ernst 
& Young had issued an audit opinion with respect to the 1990 
financial statements of Community Psychiatric Centers, and 
the plaintiffs alleged that the opinion was fraudulent because 
it did not disclose that the corporation had substantial 
uncollectible accounts.225
In evaluating whether the alleged fraud could meet the 
“in connection with” requirement, the Ninth Circuit indicated 
that it had adopted the standard set out in Texas Gulf 
Sulphur that “false and misleading assertions are made ‘in 
connection with’ securities trading ‘whenever [such] 
assertions are made . . . in a manner reasonably calculated to 
influence the investing public.’ ”
 
226  The court then determined 
that an accountant that gives a fraudulent audit opinion, 
knowing that it will be included in a Form 10-K, meets the 
requirements of the Texas Gulf Sulphur standard.227  
According to the court, “[w]hile an outside accounting firm 
might be blameless where it had no reason to know that its 
client would use its audit report to sell securities, or where it 
instructed its client not to release the report to the public,” 
that was not the case for Ernst & Young.228
With respect to its final factor, the Fourth Circuit in 
Pirate Investor determined that the defendants distributed 
their misrepresentations through a medium “on which a 
reasonable investor would rely.”
 
229  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court cited Texas Gulf Sulphur’s 
determination that a misrepresentation is within the scope of 
Rule 10b-5 when it is made “in a manner reasonably 
calculated to influence the investing public.”230
 
 224. McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 391 (9th Cir. 1996). 
  The court 
noted that the Texas Gulf Sulphur standard had been refined 
by several circuits such that, for the SEC to establish that a 
misrepresentation is “in connection with” a securities 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 392–93. 
 227. Id. at 397. 
 228. Id.  
 229. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 230. Id. at 249 (citing S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d 
Cir. 1968)). 
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transaction, the SEC must establish that “(1) the 
misrepresentation[] . . . [was] disseminated to the public in a 
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely and (2) 
[the misrepresentation was] material when disseminated.”231  
The court noted, however, that an e-mail is not a medium of 
the same type as those considered sufficient by other courts 
and that one typically would not expect a reasonable investor 
to rely on an e-mail.232  The court nevertheless found 
compelling the fact that, because the defendants targeted 
investors who subscribed to internet investment newsletters 
and who therefore put faith in investment advice received on 
the internet, the defendants “knew that they were directing 
their misstatements to particular investors who did rely on 
internet investment advice.”233
Pirate Investor’s fourth factor is a longstanding test and 
is very useful for measuring when a fraud satisfies the 
general principle described in Part II.C.  How a defendant 
disseminates a misrepresentation certainly gives insight into 
whether he or she intended to influence, or knew or was 
reckless in not knowing that his or her actions could 
influence, an investment decision.  Courts should be careful, 
however, not to apply the factor too narrowly.  It is quite 
possible, as in an e-mail of the type used in Pirate Investor, 
that a perpetrator of a fraud could intend to influence an 
investment decision even when it uses a means on which a 
reasonable investor might not rely.  Pirate Investor seems to 
suggest that, if Pirate had distributed its e-mail more 
broadly, the fourth factor might not weigh in favor of finding 
the requisite transactional nexus for Rule 10b-5.  This, it 
seems, would be a mistake.  If a person intended to influence 
an investment decision, the fact that the means are unusual 
should not alter the determination that the required 
connection exists. 
 
 
 231. Id. (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 
2000)).  
 232. Id. at 250 (noting that other courts have applied the standard to 
“research reports from a reputable broker; prospectuses; the sales and 
marketing materials at brokerage houses and other points of sale; SEC filings; 
and detailed drug advertisements published in sophisticated medical journals.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 233. Id. at 251. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Ames, the Second Circuit observed that Bankers 
Trust’s broad interpretation of the “in connection with” 
requirement has obscured the analysis appropriate for 
“straightforward” securities fraud cases,234 and it warned that 
cases at the fringes should not affect the analysis of ordinary 
frauds, which affect market integrity.235
The Fourth Circuit’s framework for analyzing Rule 10b-5 
“in connection with” requirement nevertheless offers a good 
start for approaching the requirement.  When guided by a 
general principle supported by Supreme Court precedent and 
molded to be consistent the principle’s contours, Pirate 
Investor’s multifactor test offers a methodical and workable 
means for considering whether a fraud meets the 
transactional nexus requirement. 
  The fraud at issue in 
Pirate Investor certainly threatened market integrity, and the 
Fourth Circuit’s indiscriminate application of its multifactor 
framework bordered on the type of errant analysis warned 
about by Ames. 
Accordingly, courts should determine that a fraud is “in 
connection with” the purchase or sale of a security for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5 only when the perpetrator of the fraud 
intended to influence, or knew or was reckless in not knowing 
that his or her actions could influence, an investment 
decision.  In making this determination in a misappropriation 
case, courts should consider—as the Supreme Court has 
commanded—whether a securities transaction was necessary 
to complete the fraud.  With respect to other types of fraud, 
however, courts should apply the following non-exclusive and 
non-mandatory factors, which have been derived from Pirate 
Investor and modified and supplemented as described above: 
• whether the defendant benefited from the 
misstatements or omissions; 
• whether the parties’ relationship was such that it 
would necessarily involve trading in securities; 
• whether, through written or spoken words or 
other conduct, the defendant encouraged a 
 
 234. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 966 (2d Cir. 
1993) (stating that frauds involving face-to-face transactions are atypical and 
“pose analytical difficulties not present in a straightforward case” like Ames). 
 235. Id.  
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securities transaction; and 
• whether material misrepresentations were 
disseminated to the public in a medium upon 
which a reasonable investor would rely. 
Such an approach to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” 
requirement is clear and logical.  It might even satisfy Judge 
Posner. 
 
